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A prominent federal judge who knows the field well suggested that I
immerse myself in Steve Burbank’s work when I started as a civil procedure
scholar and teacher. “Burbank could have dined out his whole career on the
Enabling Act history alone,” I recall the judge telling me. This advice was
sound for reasons that went well beyond scholarly inspiration. The judge’s
advice prompted me to send Professor Burbank an e-mail asking for feedback
on one of my first articles. I had hoped for just enough of a response to warrant
including his name in the article’s acknowledgments. I could never have
imagined all that followed. Professor Burbank has given me years of generous,
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Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I am grateful to Bob Bone, LaToya Baldwin Clark, Zach
Clopton, Blake Emerson, David Grewal, Rick Marcus, Luke Norris, Nina Rabin, Judith Resnik,
Joanna Schwartz, Matthew Shapiro, Norm Spaulding, and Tobias Wolff for comments on previous
drafts. Steve Burbank has been a generous mentor, supporter, and friend. I wish I could thank him
in a manner commensurate with all he has done for me.
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undeserved mentorship. By his example, he has shown me time and again how
a revered colleague draws on a rich reservoir of professional capital to build a
national community of scholars. His guidance and friendship have enriched
my career beyond measure. I am deeply honored to contribute to this
Festschrift.
Professor Burbank’s scholarship grapples with nearly every aspect of what
I call the “Federal Rules System.” This is the dominant procedural system for
American civil justice, one taught in virtually every American law school’s
first-year civil procedure course.1 Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and their use in the federal courts lie at the system’s center, it
includes much more. Importantly, the Federal Rules System, by my definition
of the term, embraces the procedural regimes of many American
jurisdictions.2 They share many of the system’s constituent components,
particularly a trans-substantive default architecture for civil litigation.3 These
components also include the assignment of a procedural regime’s
maintenance, at least in part, to court-supervised experts working outside the
political process and under judicial supervision.4 They also involve a set of
cultural expectations about litigation, particularly its adversarial and partydriven nature.5
Professor Burbank wrote the canonical history of the Federal Rules
System’s origins.6 He has subjected nearly every aspect to influential

1

2

3
4
5

6

David L. Noll, A Reader’s Guide to Pre-Modern Procedure, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 414, 414–15 (2015); Jack
B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1902 (1989).
E.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 910 (1987) (“Approximately half of the states adopted
almost identical rules, and procedural rules in the remainder of the states bear their influence.”);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237 (1989) (“[The Federal Rules] have been adopted in a majority of
the states and have been a principal source of borrowing in states with strong traditions of autonomy
in matters of procedural law, notably California, Illinois, and New York.”); see also Robert G. Bone,
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J.
887, 897 (1999) [hereinafter Bone, Process] (“Enthusiasm for court rulemaking and the Federal
Rules spread rapidly after World War II. Many states followed the federal lead in giving the
rulemaking function to the courts.”).
Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821, 872–73 (2018).
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-109 (delegating rulemaking power to the Arizona Supreme Court and
providing that these rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights of [any] litigant”).
E.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1969, 1969 (1989) (“The Federal Rules . . . have become part of the consciousness of lawyers,
judges, and scholars who worry about and live with issues of judicial procedure.”).
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
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theoretical, doctrinal, and empirical scrutiny.7 He has played central roles in
the system’s evolution.8 Immersion in Professor Burbank’s work that this
Festschrift occasioned thus invites immodestly broad claims. I marshal a lot
of Professor Burbank’s scholarship to support mine. With apologies,9 here it
is: the Federal Rules System has collapsed.
The erosion of the system’s two core pillars has triggered this collapse.10
The first, the principle of rulemaker primacy, steered primary responsibility for
procedural change and reform to an apolitical rulemaking process. The
second core pillar, the principle of substantive neutrality, legitimated the principle
of rulemaker primacy. If meaningful procedural change can proceed without
ideologically-fraught regulatory or distributive consequences, then it can take
place outside politics. Over the past fifty years, the domain of what could
plausibly pass muster as substantively neutral has shrunk considerably. As a
result, rulemaker primacy has become increasingly impossible to sustain.
Power over meaningful procedural change has passed to other institutions,
hollowing out the Federal Rules System.
To anyone conversant in bitter procedural battles of the past twenty
years, the question is not so much whether the Federal Rules System has
indeed suffered. Rather, how did a procedural system dependent on a claim
of substantive neutrality ever operate in the first place?11 This question’s
answer helps identify the cause of decline. I provide one in Part I. The key
moment is 1966. Rule 23 came into effect that year, generating the modern
class action. The class action’s vast regulatory and distributional
consequences make this landmark reform, exemplifying the principle of
rulemaker primacy, unthinkable today. What made it possible was the
“postwar liberal consensus,” a period during which American elites believed
in and advocated for universal agreement on political, economic, and social

7
8

9
10
11

The list of works that fits this description is too long to summarize.
Professor Burbank helped draft the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. He played a special master role in the Amchem litigation. He contributed essential research
that supported amendments to Rule 11. This is just a partial list.
Stephen B. Burbank, Thinking, Big and Small, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 530 (2013) (“I think that
an apology is more often appropriate for attempts to think big, at least in the field of procedure.”).
I draw these principles from the “foundational assumptions” Professor Burbank identifies here:
Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 536.
Sarah Staszak, Procedural Change in the First Ten Years of the Roberts Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 691,
699 (2016) (“In many ways, it seems striking that anyone would have argued that the civil rules
were at any time ‘apolitical’; but that characterization is precisely what made them such powerful
tools for social reform, and what kept rulemaking authority insulated for so long.”).
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fundamentals.12 Meaningful procedural change could come from the
rulemaking process without violating the principle of substantive neutrality,
because everyone—or everyone who “mattered”—agreed on the substance.
Since 1966, conditions of consensus have yielded to conditions of
polarization and inequality. The domain of substantive neutrality has shrunk
dramatically, eroding the basis for rulemaker primacy and leaving
rulemakers able to generate mostly technocratic adjustments to settled
practice.13 I describe the consequences for the Federal Rules System in Part
II. Its hallmarks now include delegation and acquiescence, as rulemakers
yield their power, and irrelevance, as the needs of American civil justice
exceed the system’s capacity to address them.
The Federal Rules System left Camelot long ago, as others have argued
for decades.14 But my diagnosis of collapse differs from previous diagnoses of
decline. The latter hold the promise of reversal—if the system can just
produce better rules,15 for instance, or if some new source of legitimacy can
rejuvenate it.16 With the system’s core principles eroded, I believe it is time
to move on, to identify new principles for a new system. The conditions that
triggered the Federal Rules System’s collapse make the choice unavoidably
political. The conservative legal movement has already fashioned what I
term the principle of neoliberalism to guide its preferred path for procedural
evolution.17 I end by introducing how progressives might craft an alternative,
12

13
14

15

16
17

Michael Heale, Historians and the Postwar Liberal Consensus, in THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS
RECONSIDERED: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE POSTWAR ERA 29, 29, 32 (Robert
Mason & Iwan Morgan eds., 2017).
Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 916.
E.g., Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1839, 1841 (2014) (arguing that “we are now in a distinct, fourth era” during which the “core
values” of the Federal Rules “have been eviscerated”); Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 889 (“The level
of discontent [with the Federal Rules] is unprecedented in the sixty-five year history of federal
rulemaking in the field of civil procedure.”); Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2219, 2220 (1989) [hereinafter Resnik, Domain] (“[T]he issue that dominates most discussions of
procedure today is whether the Rules enable speedy dispositions and help to control judicial
workload.”); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
494–95 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith] (“Many in the legal profession now criticize aspects
of the Rules and demand revision.”).
E.g., Brooke Coleman, Janus-Faced Rulemaking, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 921, 942 (2020) (“While there
are valid critiques of the rulemaking process, it is still an excellent vehicle for rule reform.”); Robert
G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 320 (2008)
[hereinafter Bone, Effective] (arguing that the current “Advisory Committee is in a good position to
take on this challenging task” of reforming the Federal Rules).
Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 940–43.
Luke Norris has also suggested that recent directions in procedural evolution follow a neoliberal path.
Luke Norris, Neoliberal Civil Procedure, 12 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (draft at 2),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3793658 [https://perma.cc/BZG9-YM2Z].
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a principle rooted in a conception of equality meaningfully responsive to
some of the inequities that have ended the Federal Rules System.
To be clear, the causal story I tell here does not assign blame to any
particular institution. Rulemakers and courts deserve scrutiny for the choices
they make, to be sure. If I am right, however, deeper currents in American
political, social, and economic life have largely determined possibilities for
the evolution of procedural doctrine. The appreciation that procedure
necessarily mirrors the conditions of American political culture makes the
recognition of a new principle all the more urgent.
I. THE CONDITIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY: 1938 AND 1966
A. The Principles of Rulemaker Primacy and Substantive Neutrality
Originating in 1938, the Federal Rules System centers around the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the apolitical rulemaking process the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934 created.18 The Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee, a
group of experts appointed by the Chief Justice and ultimately supervised by the
Supreme Court, dominates this process. But the system includes more than a set
of rules and a core institution or their state equivalents. It also encompasses a
litigation culture, one embodied in the procedural systems of almost every state.
The basic architecture for a civil lawsuit the Federal Rules establish provides the
default norm for what adjudication looks like—an architecture premised on
adversarial, party-driven litigation activity.19 Participants in the system conceive
of procedural problems and possible solutions in terms of rules and possible
reforms.
The twin pillars on which this system rested reflect two of the
“foundational assumptions” Professor Burbank has identified for “modern
American procedure.”20 The first, echoed by the principle of rulemaker
primacy, assumes that “once made through ‘The Enabling Act Process,’ [the

18

19
20

I appreciate that the terms “apolitical” and “substantive neutrality” are contestable as descriptions of the
Federal Rules System as crafted, intended, and in operation at any point in time. E.g., Resnik, Domain,
supra note 14, at 2225–26 (“[N]either the theory of neutrality nor the theory of anonymity [of the Federal
Rules] turns out to be as true in practice as in theory.”). But I also believe the bipartisan support for
federal rulemaking during the years preceding the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, the remarkable
dearth of controversy the Rule 23 amendments prompted in 1966, and the Advisory Committee’s
commitment to consensus in recent decades all evidence a longstanding commitment to and reality of a
kind of neutrality that distinguishes rulemaking from other policymaking domains.
Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 14, at 516–17.
Burbank, supra note 10, at 536.
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Federal Rules] can only be changed through that process (or by
legislation).”21
The principle of substantive neutrality follows from the second, that “the
‘general rules’ required by the 1934 Rules Enabling Act should not only be
uniformly applicable in all federal district courts, but uniformly applicable in
all types of cases . . . .”22 The Federal Rules’ trans-substantivity honors this
assumption. This design feature prevents rules from serving or disserving
particular ends of substantive justice. Trans-substantive rules therefore claim
value-neutrality, a quality that honors limits on the scope of power delegated
to the rulemaking process.23 As Professor Burbank’s canonical history of the
Enabling Act reveals, Congress intended to retain control over procedural
lawmaking “where the choice among legal prescriptions would have a
predictable and identifiable effect on . . . rights” “recognized by federal or
state substantive law . . . and interests recognized by the Constitution.”24
Otherwise, rulemaker primacy prevailed.
The principle of substantive neutrality both defined the domain within which
the principle of rulemaker primacy could operate, and it gave the institutional
preference the latter principle conveys essential normative support.25 An expertdriven process outside of politics could exercise power over procedural change
legitimately if this change did not entail choices of substantive value.26 By
21

22

23
24

25
26

Id; see also David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law
Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 504 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus, Legal Realism] (describing Charles Clark’s
argument for a standing Advisory Committee with the authority to “make changes in the rules . . .
and thus function as a built-in pragmatic mechanism to ensure good rules”).
Burbank, supra note 10, at 536; see also Bone, Effective, supra note 15, at 324 (“[P]rocedural rules could and
should be general in nature and ‘trans-substantive,’ meaning that a single set of rules should apply to all
civil cases despite varying substantive stakes.”); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2067, 2079 (1989) (“Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are seldom written . . . in terms designed to
operate differently according to the substantive nature of a claim or defense.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Of
Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 713
n.140 (1988) (“The question whether uniformity [of the Federal Rules] necessarily entails transsubstantive uniformity was not addressed, probably because it was assumed.”).
David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL
L. REV. 371, 374 (2010).
Burbank, supra note 6, at 1113–14; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1007 (1983)
(“Congress’ concerns seem to have been rulemaking in areas where choices would have a
predictable and identifiable impact or rights claimed under the substantive law or on interests
claimed under the Constitution . . . .”).
Marcus, supra note 23, at 398; Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 896.
Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 894–96; cf. Burbank, supra note 10, at 543 (suggesting that every
“advisory committee” has honored the “foundational assumption” of trans-substantivity because
“departures from it raise questions of institutional power and legitimacy”).
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contrast, the principle of substantive neutrality routed responsibility for
procedural change to other institutions if the change’s regulatory or
distributional consequences prompted ideologically salient controversy.
B. Substantive Neutrality and the 1938 Generation
Most of us would probably accept as substantively neutral something like
a rule that requires parties to meet-and-confer on a format for the exchange
of electronically stored information in discovery. But more significant
procedural reform invariably prompts deep controversy little different from
fighting over substantive legal change.27 This could not always have been so,
however, because the Federal Rules System once generated not just
meaningful but seismic procedural reform. What did “[t]he myth of
procedure as the neutral facilitator of the substantive law” mean in 1938,
when one generation of rulemakers created the Federal Rules System?28
What about in 1966, when their successors unleashed the modern class
action?
Neither my research into the 1938 generation nor the landmark studies by
Professor Burbank and others offer conclusive answers.29 The 1938 rules may
have seemed nonpartisan because reformers of all ideological stripes had
championed the decades’ long campaign for the Enabling Act.30 Perhaps
rulemakers as good New Dealers and Progressives believed that technocratic
expertise made their choices legitimate, whatever substantive effects their new
rules had.31 The 1938 generation may have genuinely believed in a meaningful
substance/procedure dichotomy, albeit one divided by a shadowy boundary.32
Given the boundary’s uncertain location, perhaps rulemakers felt confident to

27
28

29
30

31
32

Dana S. Reda, What Does It Mean to Say That Procedure Is Political?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2203, 2205–
07 (2017).
Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221,
228 (1997); cf. Hazard, supra note 2, at 2246 (“[The] relationship between civil justice and social
justice was not anticipated in 1938.”).
My research is available at Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 21. Landmark studies include Burbank,
supra note 6; Bone, Process, supra note 2; and Subrin, supra note 2.
E.g., Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 79, 108–10 (2006)
(describing the overlapping and conflicting support both progressives and conservatives voiced for
the Federal Rules).
Jordan M. Singer, The Federal Courts’ Rulemaking Buffer, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2239, 2276–80
(2019); Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 895–96.
Marcus, supra note 23, at 399–400; Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 895–96.
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proceed so long as their work could plausibly claim substantive neutrality’s
mantle.33
None of these explanations entirely satisfies. Surely others agreed with
Thurman Arnold’s insistence in 1932 that “[s]ubstantive law is canonized
procedure,” and “[p]rocedure” simply “unfrocked substantive law.”34 His
realist allies spilled oceans of ink challenging law’s autonomy from politics.
The notion that they would have deemed “adjectival law” immune from
their most basic charge seems farfetched.35 This is especially so given that the
1938 generation labored after a decades-long progressive campaign against
the procedural advantages that systematically favored turn-of-the-century
corporate litigants.36
Perhaps there is simply no good answer to the question of what
substantive neutrality meant in 1938. To quote Richard Marcus, 1938 was
the Federal Rules System’s “Big Bang.”37 An attempt to reconcile its
generation’s work with the principle of substantive neutrality tries to square
the circle. This generation had a system to create. Principles could come
later.
C. Substantive Neutrality and the 1966 Generation
The 1966 generation worked well after the Big Bang. Its revisions to Rule
23 had vast regulatory and distributive consequences. How did Benjamin
Kaplan (the Advisory Committee’s reporter), Albert Sacks (its associate
reporter), and Charles Alan Wright (a key member) stretch the license given
them by the principle of substantive neutrality far enough to create the modern
class action?

33

34
35
36

37

Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse or Cure?, JUDICATURE
Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 163, 166 (“The insight of the Legal Realists that there is no bright line between
‘procedure’ and ‘substance’ was for decades the main redoubt of those responsible for procedural
lawmaking when challenged for overreaching.”). The Supreme Court effectively endorsed this
permissive take on substantive neutrality in 1941 when it interpreted the Enabling Act’s delegation
of power to allow any rules that “really regulate[] procedure.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, 14 (1941); see also Burbank, supra note 6, at 1108 (critiquing Sibbach).
Thurman Arnold, The Rôle of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617,
645 (1932).
Cf. Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462, 513–14 (2017)
(describing the political motivations of New Deal-era supporters of procedural reform).
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, 4 (1992); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm:
Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 682 (1999).
Richard Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 300–301 (2008).
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To a significant extent, the 1966 generation worked behind a veil of
ignorance. The chief substantive legal developments that would turn the class
action into an engine of regulation and redistribution had not fully flowered
before the Advisory Committee finished most of its work.38
But Kaplan, Sacks, and Wright did not stumble around entirely in the dark.
Among other motivations, they wanted to codify procedural advances that
some federal judges had made to aid plaintiffs in desegregation class actions.39
The 1966 generation crafted a trans-substantive rule. But a clear ideological
impetus animated at least part of their efforts. I know of no answer buried in
archival records to the question of how to reconcile the work they did to
champion desegregation litigation with the principle of substantive neutrality.
The question may never have occurred to the 1966 generation as a problem to
solve.
Situating the 1966 generation’s work in jurisprudential and political
context, however, permits at least some speculation as to how its members
might have responded. Kaplan and Sacks, had strong—in Sacks’ case,
foundational—connections with legal process theory.40 Its adherents
attempted to reconcile the realist insistence that legal decisionmaking
necessarily entailed policymaking with a claim to law’s autonomy from
politics.41 This synthesis included two core claims.42 First, when a dispute
arises, a lawyer’s central concern is which institution should settle it, “with
authority allocated according to each institution’s relative ‘competence’ to

38

39
40

41

42

See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 587, 606–07 (2013) (describing changes to regulatory regimes commonly enforced in class
actions “that happened with eerie coincidence just as the ink dried” on the revised Rule 23).
David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63
FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–08 (2011).
Sacks’s legal process bona fides need no proof. For Kaplan and legal process, see, e.g., Benjamin
Kaplan, Civil Procedure – Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 430 (1960); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 964 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT M.
COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)) (“The legal process synthesis . . .
characterizes the 1953 edition of Field and Kaplan . . . .”).
Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 567 (1988); id. at 569;
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process
Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 695 (1987); Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 503, 517 (1997).
On these claims and their relationship, see, e.g., William M. Wiecek, American Jurisprudence After the
War: “Reason Called Law”, 37 TULSA L. REV. 857, 869 (2002). For a richer account of the substantive
value embedded in process theory than what I offer here, see Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of
Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 1273, 1292–94 (1995).
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handle the matter.”43 The second was the “principle of institutional
settlement”: “decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established
procedures for making decisions of this kind ought to be accepted as binding
on the whole society . . . .”44 Together, these claims offered a measure of
legitimation minimally beholden to claims of substantive value.45 When the
institutionally competent entity, whether legislature, court, or agency, makes
a decision pursuant to the procedures and modes of reasoning appropriate
to it, the resolution is legitimate even if participants could disagree on the
substance.46 Law’s neutrality, in other words, flowed from procedural rigor.
To process theorists, expertise legitimated agencies’ policymaking choices,
provided agencies stayed within the boundaries of delegated power.47 The
capacity to resolve problems with “reasoned elaboration” gave judicial decisionmaking its particular competence.48 Reasoned elaboration includes the
requirement that the judge’s “decision is to be arrived at by reference to
impersonal criteria of decision applicable in the same fashion to any similar
case.”49 Process theorists accepted the realist insistence that judges made policy,
and no one doubted that agencies did too. But an expertise-driven decision
within the bounds of delegation, or a principled decision arrived at through
reasoned elaboration, could claim normative legitimacy by a measure of value
independent of whatever regulatory or distributive consequences this decision
had.
As a hybrid judicial-administrative body, the Advisory Committee could
draw upon both expertise and reasoned elaboration as a source of legitimacy for
its work.50 The principle of substantive neutrality, then, only modestly
43
44
45

46
47
48
49
50

William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV.
2031, 2043 (1994); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 255 (1995).
Henry M. Hart, Jr., & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 4 (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
See Robert G. Bone, Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to Adjudication Theory, 2015 J. DISP.
RESOL. 129, 138–39 (2015) (describing process jurists’ focus on institutional design and interest in
“well-designed institutions” “vest[ing a] decision with legitimacy apart from the substantive values
it implemented”); Peller, supra note 41, at 567 (describing process theory’s “model of legal
legitimation” as premised on a “neutral, apolitical, reasoned . . . discourse” that emphasized
“process” apart from “substance”).
See Peller, supra note 41, at 570 (“Procedural and jurisdictional legitimacy could be neutrally and
apolitically determined, even if substantive legitimacy could not.”).
Id. at 597.
DUXBURY, supra note 43, at 260; Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (1991).
Wiecek, supra note 42, at 870 (quoting Hart & Sacks materials).
Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 897–99; cf. Benjamin Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The Legislature’s
Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 252
(1951) (discussing competence of courts and legislatures to reform procedure).
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constrained the 1966 generation’s power. The Enabling Act, interpreted
permissively in 1941,51 delegated wide berth to the Advisory Committee, and an
expert assessment of procedural need could surely leave open a number of
legitimate options. Transsubstantivity, the Federal Rules System’s signature
design feature, ensured that rules would measure up by “impersonal criteria of
decision.”52 The multilevel process for rule promulgation that rulemaking
followed in the 1960s all but guaranteed reasoned elaboration.53 Preferences or
motivations, then, did not matter to a rule’s consistency with the principle of
substantive neutrality.
In 1954, Sacks identified “the triumph of a principle” as the “outstanding
feature” of Brown v. Board of Education.54 He also lauded the decision for “the
care” the Court took “in the process of reaching and promulgating” it.55
Brown, in other words, succeeded by a legal process metric, one independent
of its regulatory or distributional consequences. To someone like Sacks, Rule
23 could be Brown’s procedural equivalent—a “triumph” by a legal process
metric of legitimacy, even if it also happened to mesh with Sacks’ ideological
priors.56
But there is more to the 1966 generation’s story, one not as substantively
bereft as the foregoing suggests.57 A substantively thick set of assumptions in
postwar American political culture made a thin, procedurally-justified measure
of value plausible. Legal decision-making can seem substantively neutral if
everyone—or everyone who matters—agrees fundamentally on the substance.
This was just the case for the elites, including process theorists, who
championed the “post-war liberal consensus.”58 This “sunshine and morning
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See supra note 33 (discussing Sibbach).
See Wiecek, supra note 42, at 870 (quoting Hart & Sacks materials).
A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 168 F.R.D. 679, 685–86 (1995).
Albert M. Sacks, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 96 (1954).
Id. at 97.
On Sacks’ commitment to the civil rights movement, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 2050
& n.114.
For a rich account of other aspects of process theory’s substantive commitments, see Bone, supra
note 42, at 1311–13.
E.g., Peller, supra note 41, at 573 (“[M]ainstream American intellectual cultural in the post-War
years was unified around a self-imagine of tolerance, pluralism, and modernist sophistication,
within which the distinction between process and substance could seem to play a progressive and
liberal role.”); DUXBURY, supra note 43, at 242–43 (asserting that the time recentered liberaldemocratic values); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 765 (1987) (“An additional reason for the prevailing faith in the autonomy of
law was the remarkable political consensus of the late 1950s and early 1960s.”); G. Edward White,
From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 SW. L. REV. 819, 829 (1986)
(describing the Pre Civil Rights Era as a time of “deep consensus among Americans about values
and institutional roles”); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism
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glory vision of American political culture”59 viewed American capitalism as
“capable of generating abundance for every stratum of society . . . without
necessity for hard choices.”60 Several decades of postwar economic growth
made “perplexities and conflicts long thought endemic to market economics
appear[] . . . to have resolved themselves.”61 The consensus also understood
“social problems in America” as “residual” and capable of being “‘cured’ by
the action of government.”62 Racism, primarily a phenomenon of a
“backward region”—the South—”that did not truly represent the United
States,” was “an aberration, a ‘running sore’ on an otherwise healthy body
politic.”63 Traditional gender roles went unquestioned.64 Most
fundamentally, the consensus viewed American democracy as a broadly
representative process able to distribute fairly the largesse of an everexpanding economic pie.65 The postwar liberal consensus, with process
theory as its jurisprudential expression, celebrated the American status quo
as basically good and only in need of modest adjustment.66

59

60
61

62

63

64

65
66

and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 296 (1973) (noting a “disintegration of common values or
goals” in the 1970s).
Reuel Schiller, Law, Liberalism, and the New History of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1257,
1271 (2010) (reviewing THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2008)).
Geoffrey Hodgson, Revisiting the Liberal Consensus, in THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED,
supra note 12, at 12, 22.
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 61,
62 (2017); see also Gary Gerstle, Race and the Myth of the Liberal Consensus, 82 J. AM. HIST. 579, 579
(1995) (“Everyone agreed that the productivity of American capitalism . . . had made questions of
class inequality meaningless . . . .”).
Hodgson, supra note 60, at 22; see also Gary Gerstle, The Reach and Limits of the Liberal Consensus, in THE
LIBERAL CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED, supra note 12, at 54 (advancing the mid-twentieth-century idea
that “the federal government could be called upon to solve a great variety of social problems”).
Gerstle, supra note 61, at 579, 582; cf. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 61, at 66 (describing how
symptoms of racism—like economic exclusion of African-Americans—were regarded as
“exceptions” to a system working for everyone).
Helen Laville, Gender in an Era of Liberal Consensus, in THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED,
supra note 12, at 245, 246 (“[T]he strongly gendered nature of the division between public and
private spheres . . . lay at the heart of the ideology of liberal consensus.”).
Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism,
1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1399–1401 (2000); DUXBURY, supra note 43, at 247–48.
Hodgson, supra note 60, at 14 (“America’s destiny is to spread the message of the benefits of
capitalism to the rest of the world.”); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 2050 (“Legal process
thinkers did not consider substantive fairness to be a primary element of political legitimacy, and
this suggestion amounted to an acquiescence in the status quo.”); Eskridge & Frickey,, supra note
41, at 697 (describing the “optimistic pluralism assumption” of the time); Gerstle, supra note 61, at
579 (“Everyone agreed that the productivity of American capitalism and its capacity to spread
affluence throughout the social order had made questions of class inequality meaningless and that
political conflict would be limited to well-regulated and institutionalized struggles among interest
groups over how much affluence would come their way.”).
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Less a description of a reality than a “political project,”67 the postwar
consensus attracted support from a “liberal elite” bent on defending the
supremacy of American politics and culture amidst Cold War stresses.68
Their ranks included “lawyers and academics of the eastern and western
megapolises,” precisely the homogenous stratum from which the 1960s
Advisory Committee drew its members.69 To them, a rule designed to favor
desegregation plaintiffs may have had an ideological impetus. But Rule 23
could still claim the mantle of substantive neutrality, as a reform exemplifying
the sort of modest change that corrected for flaws in an otherwise healthy
legal system. Desegregation litigation helped to dismantle barriers that
excluded Black Americans from the essential goodness of American life. A
class action that aided this litigation strengthened, rather than altered, the
status quo as men like Sacks, Kaplan, and Wright may have envisioned it.
The conditions of consensus that made Rule 23 possible were
disintegrating by mid-1960s, just as the Advisory Committee finished its work
on the modern class action.70 The “trente glorieuses” of post-war economic
growth that excused a reckoning with economic inequality ended.71 The fury
with which Northern whites in the late 1960s and 1970s resisted residential
desegregation and busing proved the depths of the postwar consensus’s race
illusion.72 So did the burgeoning of a right-wing reaction to postwar liberalism,
a backlash that elites could overlook in the 1960s but not by the 1970s.73
Second wave feminism upended gender roles that had hardened after World
War II.74

67
68
69
70

71
72
73
74

Wendy L. Wall, The 1930s Roots of the Postwar “Consensus”, in THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 12, at 67, 69.
Hodgson, supra note 60, at 25.
Id. at 23; cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United
States of America, 45 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 675, 700 (1997) (commenting on rulemaker homogeneity).
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 2051 (noting that “[b]etween 1963 and 1973, the socio-political
conditions for the legal process synthesis ended” as “the ideological consensus exploded” and
“America rediscovered scarcity”).
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 22 (2014).
Gerstle, supra note 62, at 60.
See Heale, supra note 12, at 36–37 (examining the “roots [of] the New Right” and the grassroots
movement that developed in the decades before and after the 1960s).
E.g., Constance Grady, The Waves of Feminism, and Why People Keep Fighting Over Them, Explained, VOX
(July 20, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/20/16955588/feminism-wavesexplained-first-second-third-fourth [https://perma.cc/8T2T-J6WG] (describing second-wave
feminists’ advocacy against traditional gender roles); see also Laville, supra note 64, at 246–48
(detailing the erosion of gender roles post-World War II).
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Disenchantment with rulemaking dates to the beginning of the postwar
liberal consensus’s end, a coincidence whose timing suggests anything but.75
The 1966 generation finished its work in 1970, ending its term with
consequential and “decidedly” pro-private enforcement reforms to discovery
rules.76 The failure of a 1970s-long effort to amend Rule 23 followed, illustrating
how quickly the world had shifted from the 1960s.77 The next round of
significant proposals, to amend Rules 11 and 68, proved “intensely
controversial” in the 1980s.78 Ambitious efforts to reform Rule 23 largely fizzled
in the 1990s.79 Modesty and caution has characterized rulemaking this
century.80
***
To Professor Burbank and his co-author Sean Farhang, “[i]t is not easy
to explain the relative restraint of the [Advisory Committee] over the last
decade . . . .”81 They cite the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act as an
institutional explanation, noting the barriers it heightened between a
proposed rule and its promulgation.82 A complementary explanation reckons
with the fundamental conditions of political culture that determine the scope
of rulemakers’ legitimate prerogative. Rulemaker primacy requires
substantive neutrality. When everyone agrees on substance, the domain of
substantive neutrality has expansive boundaries, and rulemakers like the
1966 generation enjoy a wide berth. But the domain of what can plausibly
pass as neutral shrinks as political, social, and economic consensus
disappears. Divided attitudes toward race and racism, political polarization,
and deepening economic inequality are the stories of American public life
over the past forty years.83 The conditions of consensus that once made

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 236 (1998);
Bone, Process, supra note 2, at 900.
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1566 (2015).
Marcus, supra note 38, at 619.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 76, at 1585; cf. Yeazell, supra note 75, at 233 (identifying the efforts
in the 1980s as the last major rulemaking endeavor before the century’s end).
STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 118 (2017).
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 76, at 1592.
Id. at 1593.
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 79, at 20, 109–20.
On political polarization, see, e.g., Shanto Iyengar, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil
Malhotra & Sean J. Westwood, The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States, 22
ANN. REV. POLI. SCI. 129, 130 (2019) for an argument that there is an increasingly wide gap in
understanding between the two major political parties in America. On increasing economic inequality,
see, e.g., Katherine Schaeffer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 7,
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rulemaker primacy possible have yielded to conditions of fracture. The
domain of substantive neutrality has shrunk, and with it the ranks of
procedural problems legitimately subject to the principle of rulemaker
primacy.
II. THE FEDERAL RULES SYSTEM AFTER ITS COLLAPSE
Professors Burbank and Farhang have exhaustively documented how,
over time, procedural reform with distributional or regulatory consequence
has moved almost entirely out of the rulemaking process.84 But the pageantry
of the Federal Rules System continues. The Advisory Committee spent years
considering but ultimately passing on significant reforms to Rule 23 in the
mid-2010s.85 It now has federal multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) in its sights.86
Scholars and advocates press for significant rule changes to correct one
perceived procedural ailment or another.87 While some commentators
believe the rulemaking process is essentially healthy, others implore it to do
better.
Such expectations, demands, and advocacy will founder on the shoals of
a blunt reality. The Federal Rules System is the sick man of American civil
justice.88 We act like its empire remains powerful even as it totters on eroded

84
85
86

87

88

2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequality-inthe-u-s [https://perma.cc/VT5A-HVLU], which discusses the rise of economic inequality in the face
of the 2020 Presidential election. On divides over racial attitudes, see, e.g., 4. Views on Race and
Immigration,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Dec.
17,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/views-on-race-and-immigration/
[https://perma.cc/283J-MSHC].
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 79, at 20, 49; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and
Retrenchment in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 48 (2018).
Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in Class Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903, 921–33 (2018).
E.g., Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee 11–19 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-04-01_cv_minutes_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK3X-7ZJU] (describing
Advisory Committee consideration of rulemaking for MDL).
E.g., Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1633, 1684–85 (2017)
(proposing the promulgation of non-trans-substantive rules); Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens:
Refocusing the Litigation Cost-and-Delay Narrative, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57, 98 (2018) (discussing the
promulgation of rules tailored to particular contexts based on complexity or substance); Robert G.
Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1097, 1114–24 (2012) (outlining a plan to revise Rule 23). Lawyers for Civil Justice, a defenseoriented organization, advocates for rule amendments that would have significant distributive
effects. E.g., Allocate Discovery Costs, LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., https://www.lfcj.com/requesterpays-discovery.html [https://perma.cc/9MYT-4YMZ] (advocating for a rule that would require
the requester to pay the costs of discovery across the board).
This is a reference to a metaphor used to describe the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth
century, up to World War I.
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principles of rulemaker primacy and substantive neutrality. In this Part, I
take stock of the system as the lamps are about to go out.89 It has three
important hallmarks. The first is delegation.90 Rulemakers decline to make
procedural policy choices themselves and empower courts to do so instead.
The second is acquiescence. Rulemakers have yielded as courts have wrested
control over the procedural agenda from them. The third is irrelevance.
American civil justice’s most serious problems have regulatory and
distributional significance that places them beyond the system’s capacity to
address.
A. Delegation
If the principle of substantive neutrality requires conditions of consensus
to enable meaningful change through the rulemaking process, then
rulemakers laboring in our fractured political culture cannot drive
procedural reform of significance. They will necessarily delegate. Professor
Burbank and others have characterized the Federal Rules as “charters for
discretionary decision-making,” with “the actual choices” left “to federal trial
judges.”91 One of this century’s most controversial rule changes, the
amendment to Rule 26 requiring that judges consider the proportionality of
discovery requests, exemplifies this sort of handover to district judges.92 The
2015 amendment simply moved proportionality, originally added to Rule 26
in 1983, to its provision defining the scope of discovery.93 More than
anything else, this change may have offered the Chief Justice an occasion to
jawbone federal judges, to exhort them to require parsimony in discovery.94

89
90
91

92
93

94

This reference stays with the same theme and invokes Sir Edward Grey’s famous comment at World
War I’s start.
I am grateful to Blake Emerson for helping me to tease apart delegation and acquiescence.
Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 48 (2010); see also Bone, Effective, supra note 15, at 326–27 (“Rather than
resolving difficult and often divisive normative questions at the rulemaking stage, the Advisory
Committee tends to draft general rules with vague standards that in effect leave the hard questions
for trial judges to resolve in individual cases.”).
Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY
L.J. 1, 45–46 (2016); BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 79, at 123.
Paul W. Grimm, Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionality in the Discovery Rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 36 REV. LITIG. 117, 123–34 (2017); cf. Schultz v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Civ. No. 15–
4160, 2016 WL 3149686, at *7 (D.S.D. June 3, 2016) (“The more things change, the more they
stay the same.”).
2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6–7, supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS9E-AF5H]; cf. Roberts v. Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603–04 (D. Nev. 2016) (discussing the 2015 Amendments and the Chief
Justice’s report and concluding that change to discovery practice “is long overdue”); Dowdy v.
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Whether the post-2015 proportionality requirement will explode as a
“bomb” and limit discovery significantly will depend not on any direct choice
the committee made for discovery governance but on what judges decide to
do with it.95
Rule 23(f) is delegation in a different, more novel register. It does not enable
trial court discretion but rather enhances judicial power to craft binding class
action doctrine. Added in 1998, Rule 23(f) facilitates appellate review of class
certification decisions but itself does not prescribe standards for class certification
or settlement. It emerged after several years of intense rulemaker debate over
changes to class action practice in the mid-1990s, during which the Advisory
Committee considered but ultimately declined to refashion class certification
requirements.96 It instead opted for Rule 23(f), an amendment that has
“substantially expand[ed] the opportunities for conservative federal appellate
courts, including the Supreme Court, to control the course of class-action
jurisprudence.”97 The fruits of this appellate engagement have included
prohibitions on incentive payments for class representatives, changes to
commonality, requirements for arbitration clause enforcement, and limits on cy
pres availability.98 The doctrinal design choices for class actions that the Advisory
Committee itself has made have had a comparatively slight impact on the class
action’s availability. The 2018 Rule 23 amendments, for instance, eschewed
more controversial, fundamental changes for modest tweaks to notice obligations
and procedures for dealing with objectors and for settlement approval.99
The Rule 23 and 26 amendments do not exemplify the principle of
rulemaker primacy but its opposite—a delegation to federal judges, to

95
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97
98

99

GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 16-303, 2017 WL 10765264, at *4 (M.D. Ga. June 30, 2017)
(discussing the Chief Justice’s Report to support an order limiting discovery); BURBANK &
FARHANG, supra note 79, at 124–25 (emphasizing the Chief Justice’s belief that the 2015 discovery
amendments would be influential).
Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 11 (Feb. 10,
2014); see also Kennicott v. Sandia Corp., 327 F.R.D. 454, 471 (D.N.M. 2018) (arguing that the
proportionality requirement will turn federal judges into “Plato’s enlightened guardians”).
For the Working Papers of the Advisory Committee that reflect these deliberations, see FJC Studies
and Related Publications, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archivesrules-committees/fjc-studies-and-related-publications [https://perma.cc/VQG8-5S8X].
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1515 (2017).
Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020) (prohibiting incentive payments);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (changing commonality doctrine); Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (requiring enforcement of arbitration
clauses); In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (limiting cy pres availability).
See Marcus, supra note 85, at 921–36 (describing controversial issues of class action procedure and
contrasting them with modest changes the 2018 amendments actually made).
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empower them to make doctrinal design choices with distributional or
regulatory consequence.100 Proportionality may fit longstanding rulemaking
practice, but Rule 23(f) amounts to a surrender of the power to make binding
procedural doctrine.
Of course, the Advisory Committee has made some important choices of
procedural design over the past twenty-five years. To Richard Marcus, the
2006 amendments governing the discovery of electronically stored information
(ESI) prove that rulemaking is “not dead yet.”101 Proposed amendments to
govern social security disability benefits cases, if they succeed, would
significantly improve practice in 20,000 cases filed annually.102 But the digital
revolution prompted the ESI amendments, and the social security
amendments would bring order to procedural chaos caused by the use of trial
court rules for what is really appellate litigation.103 These technocratic reforms
remain within a shrunken domain of substantive neutrality because they have
no distributional or regulatory slant. In a mature procedural system,
meaningful opportunities for such changes and fixes will rarely present
themselves. Otherwise, substantive neutrality’s shrunken domain leaves
rulemakers room for little more than modest, arguably picayune,
adjustments.104
B. Acquiescence
Delegation happens when rulemakers opt to empower courts.
Acquiescence, or the decision to yield when courts muscle in on rulemakers’

100

101
102
103

104

Proportionality was one of three changes to discovery with an alleged “anti-litigation” skew. Elizabeth
Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755,
759 (2016). Another, to narrow the scope of discoverable material in Rule 26(b)(1), prompted little
controversy during the rulemaking process and appears to have had little effect. Memorandum from
Jeffrey S. Sutton to Scott S. Harris on Summary of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules 7
(Sept. 26, 2014); Eramo v. Rolling Stone LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, 209 (W.D. Va. 2016). The other
change, to include “the allocation of expenses” among terms that a court might include in a protective
order, codified an already-existing power. Memorandum, supra, at 9.
Marcus, supra note 37, at 300, 318; see also Letter from Stephen B. Burbank, supra note 95, at 10
(praising the 2006 amendments as a “model of careful and inclusive rulemaking”).
JONAH GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY LITIGATION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 143 (2016).
See id. at 127 (“District courts function as courts of appeals for social security claimants. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure therefore do not work well for these cases, as they are designed for civil
actions litigated in the first instance. As a result, districts and even individual judges have forged
their own workarounds. A kaleidoscopic proliferation of procedures is the result.”).
Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447,
466 (2013) (agreeing that “the politicization of judicial rulemaking” has “channel[ed]” the Advisory
Committee’s work toward “noncontroversial, largely meaningless efforts”).
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territory, confirms even more powerfully the demise of rulemaker primacy. This
principle’s success had hinged on a norm of deference by the Court to the
Advisory Committee.105 Lawmaking norms tend to buckle as conditions of
dissensus deepen in American public life.106 The Advisory Committee’s
response to Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court’s decisions raising the federal
pleading standard, illustrates the result for rulemaking—a dynamic of retreat.107
Substantive neutrality’s shrunken domain made the Committee’s unwillingness
to reinstitute notice pleading, the Federal Rules System’s cornerstone,
unavoidable.
Twombly and Iqbal prompted years of Committee deliberations over
pleading. An assertion of rulemaker primacy, at least of a sort, surfaced for a
time in its discussions. Shortly after Iqbal, Congress considered legislation that
would have reinstated notice pleading.108 To the Committee, this prospect
created a “very difficult and delicate problem for the rules process.” Its
members resolved in response “to protect institutional interests under the Rules
Enabling Act.”109 To “promote the integrity of the rulemaking process,”
Committee leadership sent letters to Congress “to urge [it] to use that process,
rather than legislation, to address pleading issues.”110 One of these letters
insisted that the Committee was “deeply involved” in deliberations over
pleading, “precisely the type of work Congress required in the Rules Enabling
Act.”111
This assertion of institutional prerogative proved feeble when the
Committee ultimately decided to defer pleading doctrine to “the
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107

108
109
110
111

E.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)
(rejecting the lower court’s effort to craft a heightened pleading requirement for civil rights litigation
against local governments and insisting that such “a result . . . must be obtained by the process of
amending the Federal Rules”).
See generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Essay, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 915 (2018) (describing the role that constitutional norms play in American government and
how increased political polarization has threatened these norms).
For other accounts, see Coleman, supra note 15, at 923–36; Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of
Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1512–31 (2013); Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation
Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and the Forms, 15 NEV. L.J. 1093, 1095–97 (2015).
Committee – Draft Minutes, in Agenda Book, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Atlanta, GA 5,
10 (Mar. 18–19, 2010).
Id. at 11, 16.
June 2010 Standing Committee – Draft Minutes, in Agenda Book, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Washington, D.C. 5 (Nov. 15–16, 2010).
Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal & Mark R. Kravitz to Patrick J. Leahy, Chair, Committee on the
Judiciary (Dec. 9, 2009), in Agenda Book, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Atlanta, GA 147,
148 (Mar. 18–19, 2010).
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evolutionary process of common-law development.”112 At first, members
resolved to “allow time for lower courts to work through the Twombly and
Iqbal invitation to reconsider pleading practices” before any Committee
action.113 As the Committee determined in 2011, “a sense that practice has
not fully crystallized in the lower courts, and the possibility that the Supreme
Court will have more to say, . . . undercut arguments that the time has come
to begin preparing rules revisions for publication and eventual adoption.”114
By 2014, however, “a growing sense that pleading practice has evolved to a
nearly mature state under the Twombly and Iqbal decisions” prompted the
Committee to take pleading reform off its agenda.115
The process of common law evolution, in other words, had to happen
before the Committee could consider reforms. But once this evolutionary
process ended, it left the Committee no work to do. This acquiescence makes
sense if uniformity in federal practice is rulemaking’s sole concern, and if the
lower courts had come to a common understanding of Rule 8 after Twombly
and Iqbal. But a procedural system’s health requires more than uniformity.
Pleading doctrine lies at “the very heart of the revolutionary 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure” and represents “the very soul of the current civil
justice system” as the Committee recognized.116 The Committee could indeed
“be pardoned for proceeding with self-conscious deliberation” and deferring
an inquiry into what pleading doctrine ought to be after it gained a robust
empirical understanding of the decisions’ effects.117 But the Committee did not
just postpone this normative engagement. It declined such engagement
altogether.
The Supreme Court can reject a proposed rule amendment, so an
attempt by the Committee to assert its institutional prerogative and undo
Twombly and Iqbal could have triggered an unprecedented rulemaking crisis.
The Committee’s forbearance, then, had the virtue of prudence. But any
such rulemaking realpolitik does not lesson a dynamic of acquiescence but
underscores it. Future efforts by the Court to refashion rules through
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June 2010 Standing Committee – Draft Minutes, supra note 110, at 22; Hoffman, supra note 107,
at 1488–89 (discussing rulemakers’ decision that it would be better to “wait for the post-Iqbal case
law to develop . . . before making any decisions about how to proceed”).
Agenda Book, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Austin, TX 28 (Apr. 4–5, 2011).
Agenda Book, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Washington, DC 41 (Nov. 7–8, 2011).
Draft Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, October 30, 2014, in Agenda Book, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, Washington, DC 39, 72 (Apr. 9–10, 2015).
January 2009 Standing Committee – Draft Minutes, in Agenda Book, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Chicago, IL 34 (Apr. 20–21, 2009).
Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading, 90 Or. L. Rev. 955, 959 (2012).
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interpretation will leave the Committee similarly handcuffed. At any rate,
the Committee did not just stay its hand. It entrenched the Court’s choice by
abrogating the illustrative forms appended to the Federal Rules.118 One had
illustrated the modest pleading standard Rule 8 as originally designed
contemplated. Twombly, Iqbal, and the “clear tension” between these
decisions and the form complaint clearly pushed the Committee to act.119
With conditions of consensus long gone, the acquiescence to the Supreme
Court by a rulemaking process acutely aware of limits to its authority was
inevitable. Twombly and Iqbal sparked intense controversy, because they
appeared to empower defendants to thwart plaintiffs’ efforts to vindicate
rights. Deliberations indicate an understanding that a Committee response
to Twombly and Iqbal, however complicated institutionally by the Court’s veto
power over a proposed amendment, would trigger legitimacy concerns. A
member asked “whether it is possible to determine whether any heightened
rate of dismissals is a good thing or bad . . . .”120 While “it is important to
gather data” about the decisions’ impact, this member agreed, “‘in the end’
the design of pleading doctrine ‘will be a policy decision.’”121 But “[i]t is
distinctly difficult for the rules committee to make policy decisions in a way
that is not political, or seen to be political.”122
Pleading doctrine, long a target for ideologically-charged civil justice
reformers,123 fell outside the shrunken domain of substantive neutrality.
Once the Court reset the pleading threshold, the rulemaking process could
do nothing but go along.
C. Irrelevance
Acquiescence’s companion is irrelevance. If the principle of rulemaker
primacy must yield when procedural needs implicate matters of regulatory
or distributional consequence, then procedural reform guided by the
118
119

120
121
122
123

E.g., Coleman, supra note 15, at 937–40 (discussing the Committee’s abrogation of Rule 84 and
elimination of Form 11).
E.g., June 2012 Standing Committee – Draft Minutes, in Agenda Book, Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules 69, 107 (Nov. 1–2, 2012) (noting that the abrogation project had received an “impetus”
from Twombly and Iqbal and the “clear tension between simplicity” of the form complaint and “the
pleading requirements announced in the Supreme Court’s decisions”).
Draft Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, March 18–19, 2010, in Agenda Book, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, Washington, D.C. 55, 67 (Nov. 15–16, 2010).
Id.; see also Cooper, supra note 117, at 959 (“The hard part will be reaching judgments about the
desirability of the new practices, if indeed the new practices become firmly established.”).
Draft Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, March 18–19, 2010, supra note 120, at 67.
E.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASED THE LAWSUIT 90–107 (1991).
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principle of rulemaker primacy can only happen if no such needs arise. This
is manifestly not the case for American civil justice.124
Within the federal courts, nothing poses a more obvious threat to the
Federal Rules System’s relevance than MDL, a species of litigation through
which billions of dollars flow each year. Although the Federal Rules apply in
MDL,125 and although the gap between MDL and more quotidian federal
litigation can be overstated,126 a fair amount of “ad hoc,” judge-fashioned
procedure governs at least some key matters in important MDL
proceedings.127 The Advisory Committee is presently exploring the
possibility of MDL-specific amendments to various of the Federal Rules,
recognizing the fact that rules for ordinary litigation have yielded in
important ways to bespoke MDL case management practices.128 But, as
Andrew Bradt writes, “the push for MDL reform” through rulemaking
“remains about power and control.”129 Defense-side interests champion
restrictive proposals to constrain a system of aggregate litigation that has
enabled mass tort litigation to flourish after the class action’s retreat.130 Given
substantive neutrality’s shrunken domain, the push for significant rule-based
governance will likely falter.131
MDL surely warrants close attention, but by nearly any metric it pales in
significance as a pressing matter of procedural policy to a crisis of inequality
124

125
126

127

128
129
130
131

For a synoptic and troubling account of the pathologies of American civil justice circa 2021, see
Norman W. Spaulding, The Ideal and the Actual in Procedural Due Process, 48 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
261, 270–90 (2021).
See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[In MDL] the relevant
law takes the form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 1300 (2020) (challenging
the notion of MDL as a “category” and suggesting that claims about unorthodox or ad hoc
procedural governance, while perhaps accurate for large MDLs, do not describe all MDLs);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Multidistrict Litigation and Common Law Procedure, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
531, 533 (2020) (challenging the claim that the relationship between the Federal Rules and MDL
procedural governance is more attenuated or different than the Federal Rules’ relationship to
procedural governance in more standard litigation).
Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook
Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1688–89 (2017) (explaining that the “very
hallmark” of MDL is that the judge can “remain flexible and creative”); David L. Noll, MDL as
Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 423 (2019) (“MDL is a world of ad hoc procedure.”).
On the MDL Subcommittee’s work, see Minutes, supra note 86, at 11–19.
Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict Litigation in Historical Perspective, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 105 (2018).
Id.
Draft Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, April 1, 2020, in Agenda Book, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules 93, 111–13 (Oct. 16, 2020) (summarizing committee members’
skepticism about the need for an MDL rule and concluding that “in the end” the committee may
“conclude that there is no need to recommend a new Civil Rule”).
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roiling American civil justice. Systemic dysfunctions now plague litigation in
state courts, where 98% of American civil cases proceed.132 The proliferation
of consumer debt collection lawsuits has made these courts part of a vast
system of economic domination.133
As Judith Resnik argued in 1986, the Federal Rules System rests on a
“faith” in “adversarial exchanges as an adequate basis for adjudication,”134 a
process that assumes that “competition between balanced opponents . . . will
lead to the triumph of truth.”135 The bases for this faith have not just declined.
They have collapsed. Parties to civil cases in 1986 may have routinely litigated
on unequal terms,136 but the percentage of civil cases in state courts of general
jurisdiction in which both sides at least had representation exceeded 95%.137
This figure has fallen by a staggering amount, to under 50%.138 The spike in
American consumer debt, itself a function of growing inequality, has driven
this change.139 This explosion has created immense amounts of litigation over
modest medical, credit card, and student loan amounts.140 Creditors and debt
buyers now bring 25% of the country’s civil cases in order to obtain judgments
they can use to garnish wages, seize bank accounts, and sometimes force
debtors into jail.141 (Another 29% are landlord-tenant disputes.)142 Most

132

133

134
135
136
137

138
139
140
141
142

E.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, LAWSUITS IN A MARKET ECONOMY 5 (2018) (describing how the
“dispersion” of the justice system across multiple layers of government results in the “vast majority”
of lawsuits occurring in state court).
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RUBBER STAMP JUSTICE: US COURTS, DEBT BUYING
CORPORATIONS, AND THE POOR 16 (2016) (observing that two debt collection companies earned
almost $1 billion through debt collection litigation).
Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 14, at 505.
Id. at 513 (describing a “series of assumptions” one must make about the participants in order to
“rely on lawyer-based adversarialism”).
Id. at 517 (describing how “major difficulty” in the era was the “problem of parity”).
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HOW DEBT COLLECTORS ARE TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF
STATE COURTS 13 (2020); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CIV. JUST. INITIATIVE, THE
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 31–35 (2015) (noting that before the decline
attorney representation was over 95%). See generally Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and
Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 901, 903 (describing the
current “breakdown in adversary procedure” due to the “unrealistic demands” of the paradigm in
today’s judicial system).
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 137, at 13.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 137, at iii.
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defendants, by nature financially strapped, lack counsel.143 The vast majority
default.144
Debt collection litigation proceeds almost exclusively in state courts and
thus beyond the formal reach of the federal rulemaking process. But the
Federal Rules System encompasses most of American civil justice, not just
federal civil procedure. Most states’ procedural regimes resemble the Federal
Rules System in key respects.145 Many states have rulemaking processes
modeled on the Enabling Act’s.146 Furthermore, as Scott Dodson argues,
“[i]n every state, federal rulemakers have exerted an extraordinary
gravitational pull on state rulemakers.”147 Forty years ago, when both sides
to the median civil action had counsel,148 federal procedural reforms had
important, if indirect, significance for state court cases.149 Now, a tranche of
American civil litigation, one far larger than the MDL docket, proceeds with
hardly any procedural governance at all, whether because cases are filed in
small claims court, or because pro se defendants lack the wherewithal to use
procedure.150

143
144
145

146

147
148
149

150

PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 137, at 13.
Id. at 2; URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, DEBT WEIGHT: THE CONSUMER CREDIT CRISIS IN NEW
YORK CITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING POOR 9 (2007).
Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 707–19 (2016) (“Most
states’ rules now mirror the Federal Rules, and the rest have been pulled toward the Federal Rules
in significant way”).
Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (2018) (finding that
forty-one states follow a model of the federal system of court-based rulemaking); John B. Oakley, A
Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 356–57 (2002) (“[W]hile true replica
jurisdictions were in the minority, the federal model of civil procedure was indeed the dominant
model among the states . . . .”).
Dodson, supra note 145, at 710.
See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 751
(2015).
E.g., Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State
Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311,
334–59 (2001) (reporting the results of a survey of pleading practice in three code pleading states
and showing how state pleading practice converges with federal pleading practice). But cf. Stephen
N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 501, 513–16 (2016) (describing a slowed
pace of formal amendments to state rules following federal rule changes).
Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 205 (2014) (finding that 83% of cases proceed as small-claims cases “in
which few or no rules of evidence are applied and in which few if any procedural safeguards are
observed”).
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Procedure itself is not irrelevant to what ails debt collection litigation.151
Reforms to rules regarding service,152 pleading,153 mandatory initial
disclosures,154 and default judgment procedures155 could help rid it of some of
its worst abuses. These changes would have to come from the states, although
federal rule changes designed for the considerable number of pro se litigants in
federal court could help to galvanize coordinated responses across the
country.156 In fact, several states have adopted or are considering debt
collection-specific rule changes.157 As Zachary Clopton has documented, state
rulemaking committees tend to have more diverse memberships than the
federal Advisory Committee.158 States also have more homogenous political

151
152

153

154

155

156

157

158

See Steinberg, supra note 148, at 746 (arguing that “an overhaul of the processes and rules that
govern litigation” is necessary to protect unrepresented parties).
E.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 137, at 16 (describing how many people may not respond
to debt claims because they have not been notified, do not recognize the company that filed the
lawsuit, or have been a victim of fraudulent service practices); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
133, at 36 (“[I]nadequate notice and even ‘sewer service’—when process servers falsely claim to have
served a defendant with notice—have been real problems in many debt buyer lawsuits.”).
E.g., Hannah Lieberman, Uncivil Procedure: How State Court Proceedings Perpetuate Inequality, 35 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 257, 263–64 (2016) (stating that pleadings in debt-buyer cases “frequently fail to
meet either fact or notice pleading standards”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN
SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION iii
(2010) (“States should require collectors to include more information about the debt in their
complaints.”).
See NEW YORK APPLESEED, DUE PROCESS AND CONSUMER DEBT: ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO
JUSTICE IN CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 4 (2010) (recommending making “certain discovery and
court inquiries into the answer automatic upon the filing of certain defenses”).
E.g., NEW ECONOMY PROJECT, THE DEBT COLLECTION RACKET IN NEW YORK: HOW THE
INDUSTRY VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND PERPETUATES ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 4 (2013) (“[N]o
application by a debt buyer for a default judgment complied with New York law.”).
On the catalyzing influence of federal rulemaking efforts on the states, see, e.g., Zachary D.
Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 411, 424–34 (2018). On the size of
the non-prisoner federal pro se docket, see JEFRI WOOD, PRO SE CASE MANAGEMENT FOR
NONPRISONER CIVIL LITIGATION vii (2016).
E.g., Verónica C. Gonzales-Zamora & George Bach, Civil Procedure Update 2020: New Mexico
Annual Judicial Conclave 3–4 (June 19, 2020) (presentation available in the University of New Mexico
School of Law Faculty Scholarship Digital Repository) (describing proposed New Mexico rule
amendment); Proposed Amendments, VT. JUDICIARY, vermontjudiciary.org/attorneys/rules/proposed
[https://perma.cc/3F7J-5ZCG] (describing proposed amendments to Rules 9.1 and 55(c)(7) of the
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 2(a), 3, and 8(c) of the Vermont Rules of Small Claims
Procedure; PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 137, at 21 (providing an overview of different states’
policy changes by statute and court rule since 2009).
Clopton, supra note 146, at 40–43 (describing how the increased diversity on state rulemaking
committees may result in a higher level of group competence and information). On a lack of
diversity on the federal Advisory Committee, see Brooke D. Coleman, #Sowhitemale: Federal
Procedural Rulemaking Committees, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 370, 388 (2020). On the benefit of diversity
on rulemaking committees, see id. at 397–400.
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cultures than the United States overall.159 Both features may enable reforms in
some jurisdictions that can shield debtors against at least some of this litigation’s
worst excesses.
But the principle of substantive neutrality will impose a formidable obstacle
to significant, widespread reforms to debt collection litigation through
rulemaking processes. The existence of a $100 billion debt-buying industry
depends on an unceasing flow of default judgments.160 For it, procedure is
substance. The mockery that debt collection litigation makes of the adversarial
assumption behind the Federal Rules System needs something along the
magnitude of Rule 23, as revised in 1966, as a response. To achieve this scale
of reform, rulemakers would have to wade deeply into the politics of inequality.
To Judith Resnik, Goldberg v. Kelly, decided in 1970, “exemplifie[d]” the
migration of “a commitment” to “the value choices expressed in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure” into administrative adjudication, among other
domains.161 As such, Goldberg represented a high-water mark of sorts for the
Federal Rules System. Debt collection litigation is the anti-Goldberg. Caseload
pressures, inadequate access to counsel, and other problems have distorted a
number of administrative adjudication systems that ensnare marginalized
groups. These pathologies have infected state court dockets, challenging any
further claim that the Federal Rules System, with its assumptions about
litigation culture, continues to characterize American civil justice in any
broad sense.162
***
To the extent that Supreme Court decision-making is representative,163
the current elaboration of procedural doctrine in the federal judiciary
proceeds in a manner utterly inconsistent with the principle of substantive
neutrality. As Professors Burbank and Farhang document, justices’ votes have
a significant ideological skew in cases addressing procedural aspects of the
enforcement of regulatory regimes through litigation. Indeed, the imbalance
159
160

161
162

163

E.g., Alan Greenblatt, All or Nothing, GOVERNING, Jan. 2019 at 40, 42–43 (describing the increasing
dominance of one-party government in American states).
Holland, supra note 150, at 186 (“[D]ebt buyers employ a high volume default judgment business
model, and . . . their legal pleadings, evidence and tactics are rarely exposed to the adversary
process”).
Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 14, at 517.
See Spaulding, supra note 124, at 285–90 (describing administrative adjudication pathologies); id. at
270–79 (describing state court pathologies); id. at 266 (“[W]hat most Americans experience is, in
truth, nothing like . . . the design debates about procedure in the federal courts . . . .”).
For evidence that circuit-level decision-making on procedural issues tracks ideology, see Stephen
B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 119
MICH. L. REV. 231, 237 (2020).
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exceeds that of their votes in cases addressing the substance of these
regimes.164
The ghost of substantive neutrality might have contributed to this
pattern.165 The veneer of impartiality the Federal Rules System could once
claim may have depressed an impulse to bind judicial hands with the
equivalent techniques of statutory interpretation or agency deference
doctrines that separation of powers concerns require.166 The extent to which
the Federal Rules license federal common-lawmaking,167 the extent to which
the Rules Enabling Act imposes meaningful limits on rulemaking,168 the
degree to which federal courts must defer procedural change to the
rulemaking process,169 and the obligation judges have to use particular
methodologies for rule interpretation all boil down to questions of power.170
Each one of these—and many more—needs a satisfying answer, lest
American civil procedure drift away from its principled moorings in the
Federal Rules System toward the assertion of judicial whim.
164
165

166

167

168
169

170

BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 79, at 190–91.
Professors Burbank and Farhang attribute this extreme polarization to the lower public salience
that decisions involving seemingly technical, non-substantive matters have, and thus the weaker
constraint that public opinion can exercise. Id. at 192.
E.g., Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and
the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1122 (2011) (noting that theories of statutory interpretation
imply theories both about Congress itself and how Congress should related to courts or agencies);
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) (“[T]he
foundation for the Chevron doctrine is anchored in the separation of powers . . . .”).
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 91, at 49–50, 75 (discussing the use of federal common law in the
context of Rules 13 and 23); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Class Actions, Statutes
of Limitations and Repose, and Federal Common Law, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2018) (discussing how the
tolling rule emerging from American Pipe under Rule 23 is a rule of federal common law).
Burbank, supra note 6, at 1034, 1108; Burbank & Silberman, supra note 69, at 699.
Compare Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1129–
30 (2018); and Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714 (2017), with Mark Herrmann, James
M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?,
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 149 (2009) (describing Twombly’s inconsistency with the
admonition that the Court must defer to the Advisory Committee).
See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2167,
2175–79 (2017) (documenting the Court’s “vacillation”); Scott Dodson, Justice Souter and the Civil
Rules, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2010) (examining Justice Souter’s fairness approach to
construing the civil rules). Compare Krupski v. Crosta Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010)
(Scalia, J., concurring); and Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring), with A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 464 (2013) (providing a thorough textualist critique of Scalia’s analysis
of Rule 23(a)(2)). See also Hermann et al., supra note 169, at 161 (challenging a defense of Twombly
and Iqbal as plausible interpretations of Rule 8 and insisting that “the degrees of separation”
“between interpretation and judge-made law” “approach one hundred and eighty” in the two
cases). For a defense of current rule interpretation practices, see Mark Moller, Internal Separation of
Powers, Compensating Adjustments, and Court Rulemaking, 36 REV. LITIG. 579 (2018).
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III. TOWARD A NEW PRINCIPLE
The time has come to craft new principles for the post-Federal Rules System
era. This recommendation is not a call for a revolution in procedural
governance.171 Even within a shrunken domain of substantive neutrality, the
federal rulemaking process makes important contributions. The proposed social
security rules will not improve our social safety net. But they will rid 20,000 cases
each year of extensive procedural confusion and thereby likely save needless
litigation expense in a practice area where margins matter.172 The rulemaking
process has attracted deserved criticism this century,173 but the people who
participate in it do so admirably.174 Moreover, an argument for the future of
procedural evolution must accept institutional reality. Absent a dramatic
political shock, the same conditions that caused the Federal Rules System to
collapse will almost surely leave courts, at least at the federal level, as the prime
movers for procedural design.175 A new system will evolve through a commonlaw process of elaboration, building on an existing procedural structure.
However gradual, the new system’s development needs normative
guidance. If the principle of substantive neutrality required conditions of
consensus, present-day conditions of fracture make the choice of principle
unavoidably ideological. Viewed accordingly, the procedural preferences the
conservative legal movement has voiced for decades reflect not naked rentseeking or deregulatory preferences but what I call the principle of neoliberalism.
I suggest what a progressive alternative, committed to equality, might entail.

171
172
173

174
175

Cf. Miller, supra note 87, at 115 (discussing the “nuclear” option of a “dramatic overhaul of the
procedural system” and its challenges).
GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 102, at 143.
E.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Online Essay, #Sowhitemale: Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
407, 408–11 (2018) (criticizing the lack of diverse representation in the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee); Yeazell, supra note 75, at 239 (criticizing the Rules Committee for its lack of “precise
knowledge of how those rules will affect them or their clients in any particular situation”).
E.g., Burbank, supra note 9, at 529 (praising Edward Cooper’s tenure as Advisory Committee
Reporter).
Professors Burbank’s and Farhang’s findings that a retrenchment agenda succeeded in the Supreme
Court, after mostly failing in the rulemaking and legislative processes, are consistent with claims
about the increase of judicial power during times of polarization more generally. BURBANK &
FARHANG, supra note 79, at 3; see Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 261, 272 (2019) (“Gridlock due to partisan competition in the political branches creates space
for the courts (especially the Supreme Court) to move the law toward their preferences without
provoking a political counterreaction.”).
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A. The Principle of Neoliberalism
The divide between substance and procedure was the landmark
jurisprudential achievement that made the Federal Rules System possible.176
This dichotomy’s dividing line now marks the boundary between politics’
vast expanse, on one hand, and a shrunken domain of substantive neutrality,
on the other. Meaningful procedural reform will almost always cross the
boundary from the latter into the former. The choice of a foundational
principle for a new system, then, is necessarily political.177
The conservative legal movement has long appreciated this reality. As
many have commented upon, and as Professors Burbank and Farhang have
so rigorously documented, the movement has pursued a procedural agenda
since the 1970s that, when realized, has blunted litigation’s capacity for
regulation and redistribution.178 These efforts fit into a larger legal program
fashioned to “assert[] and defen[d] . . . market imperatives and unequal
economic power against intervention,”179 as well as to defeat efforts at
progressive social reordering pursued through democratic politics.180
Commentators commonly but erroneously cast the conservative legal
program as “anti-litigation.”181 The American consumer debt market rests in
176
177
178

179

180

181

Marcus, supra note 23, at 374.
But see Bone, Effective, supra note 15, at 329 (“[W]hatever else procedure might do, its primary goal
is to generate quality outcomes measured by the substantive law.”).
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 79, at 3; see, e.g., J. Maria Glover, “Encroachments and Oppressions”:
The Corporatization of Procedure and the Decline of Rule of Law, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2113 (2018)
(describing corporate advocacy for procedural reform that has resulted in the “restructuring [of]
our litigation system” to favor corporate defendants).
Grewal & Purdy, supra note 71, at 1; see also Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy
Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political Economy Framework: Beyond the TwentiethCentury Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1794–1818 (2020) (explaining how principles of “[w]ealth
maximization, transaction costs, and externalities” have motivated legal change).
See WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC
POLITICS IN THE WEST 124–25 (2019) (describing how a “discourse of deregulated markets” has
been “mobilized to challenge the significance of social powers in democracies and to empower
traditional morality against equality mandates”); Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 179, at 1813
(explaining that neoliberalism encompasses the view that “any political judgments about which
social interests to secure or advance are likely to involve capture, entrenchment, and spurious claims
to a . . . ‘public interest’”); Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807, 830
(2017) (explaining that neoliberalism demands that “the state cannot intervene in the market to
produce particular substantive results”).
E.g., Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For? Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold Standard?, 78 LA. L.
REV. 739, 798 (2018) (“[C]ertain conservative and pro-business political and defense interests have
been energetically waging an anti-litigation war for many years . . . .”); Diego A. Zambrano, Federal
Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2101, 2163 (2019) (“These efforts have
been part of a broader anti-litigation movement sponsored by large institutional defendants.”);
Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist
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considerable part on the easy availability of litigation to enforce debt
contracts.182 Supporters of the conservative agenda surely do not have these
sorts of cases in their sights.183 Moreover, as Professors Burbank and Farhang
suggest, conservatives in recent years have supported a “new Litigation
State” to empower private litigants challenging tax, immigration, abortion,
and gun control legislation.184 The program’s effort to protect market
relationships and traditional social ordering from democratic
reconfiguration, then, is better described as “neoliberal” than “antilitigation.”185 A principle of neoliberalism thus animates the conservative
legal movement’s procedural reform efforts.186
Supporters of the conservative legal movement may disclaim the term
“neoliberal,”187 but it aptly describes an understanding of what litigation is
and what the conservative procedural agenda reflects. A neoliberal
understanding of litigation conceives of the process as a buttress for social
ordering created through market interactions entered into by autonomous
individuals.188 Because all litigants are individual market participants fully
responsible for the choices they make,189 neoliberal procedure favors the
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184
185

186
187

188
189

Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1198 (2006) (“[D]ozens of cases . . . reflect the antilitigation theme . . . .”). Compare Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, A New (Republican) Litigation
State?, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 657, 686 (2021) (“[B]oth parties’ posture toward private enforcement
is instrumental.”), with STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, supra note 132, at 90 (2018) (describing the politics of
“civil litigation” as a “convenient proxy for other issues,” such that the conservative agenda is not
necessarily anti-litigation).
See YEAZELL, supra note 132, at 15 (“[P]ulling against the flexibility offered by contract is the impulse
to simplify and to speed litigation, to collect debts quickly . . . . creditors will push at the front end
for imaginative (and complex) structures of credit and, at the back end, for simplified litigation.”).
Id. at 89 (noting that what “most civil litigation” entails—”business disputes and debt collection”—
is “awkward” for adversaries in the “rhetorical battle” over litigation and its supposed excesses); cf.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1754 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing
how “a defendant’s routine attempt to collect a debt from a single customer” turned into “an
unremovable attack on the defendant’s ‘credit and lending policies’”).
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 181, at 664.
Neoliberalism “refers to the revival of the doctrines of classical economic liberalism, also called
laissez-faire, in politics, ideas, and law.” Grewal & Purdy, supra note 71, at 1. It is “an overlapping
set of arguments and premises that are . . . united by their tendency to support market imperatives
and unequal economic power in the context of political conflicts that are characteristic of the
present historical moment.” Id. at 2; see also WENDY BROWN, EDGEWORK: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 39–41 (2005) (providing a similar definition of neoliberalism).
See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 179, at 1804–05 (explaining how neoliberal principles have
motivated and transformed fields including civil procedure).
Philip Mirowski, Neoliberalism: The Movement that Dare Not Speak Its Name, AM. AFFS.,
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/neoliberalism-movement-dare-not-speak-name/
[https://perma.cc/NN7S-EMVB] (“Self-identified neoliberals are hard to come by.”).
Remus, supra note 180, at 830, 864.
BROWN, supra note 185, at 42.
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enforcement of arbitration clauses, even in consumer form contracts that bind
parties of manifestly unequal bargaining power.190 Neoliberal procedure
favors a higher pleading standard and strict limits on personal jurisdiction,
because the regulatory force litigation has means that it must surmount a
“demanding justificatory bar” to interfere with transactions otherwise
mediated by the neutral, apolitical market.191 Neoliberal procedure treats the
class action as just a rule for party and claim joinder, not a device that enables
regulation through private enforcement.192 Neoliberal procedure prices the
proportionality of discovery in dollar terms, measuring the financial costs of a
discovery request against the financial value litigation holds for the requesting
party.193 Because neoliberalism conceives of litigants as autonomous
individuals, not as members of groups with socially-determined
characteristics, disabilities, and advantages,194 a mechanism for aggregating
claims that does not privilege the views of every individual joined to the case
is suspect.195
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191
192
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194
195

E.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231, 239 (2013) (rejecting a class action
claim by merchants against American Express in favor of individual arbitration as compelled by
the Federal Arbitration Act); see also Grewal & Purdy, supra note 71, at 1 (explaining that
neoliberalism is characterized by “the assertion and defense of particular market imperatives and
unequal economic power against political intervention”); Hila Keren, Divided and Conquered: The
Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Consequences of the Arbitration Revolution, 72 FLA. L. REV. 575, 579 (2020)
(describing the “arbitration revolution” as exemplifying neoliberalism); Norris, supra note 17, at 21–
31 (describing the neoliberal orientation of modern arbitration clause enforcement doctrine).
K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age:
Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (2016).
See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010) (insisting that
Rule 23 is a “species” of “traditional joinder,” and that its effects on the defendant’s liability are merely
“incidental”); Norris, supra note 17, at 31–37 (describing the neoliberal orientation of recent class action
doctrine). By this logic, so-called “no injury” classes should not be certifiable: No market failure has occurred
if the plaintiffs have no compensable injury. See, e.g., The FICALA Fix for Litigation Abuse, U.S. CHAMBER INST.
FOR LEGAL REFORM (Mar. 3, 2017), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/the-ficala-fix-for-litigation-abuse
[https://perma.cc/55XH-NGKV] (calling for the elimination of so-called “no injury” class actions).
Maureen Carroll, Civil Procedure and Economic Inequality, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 281–84 (2020)
(describing a court order requiring “the parties to create a ‘discovery budget’ based on the
‘foreseeable range of damages’ in the litigation”).
Grewal & Purdy, supra note 71, at 13 (referring to the “self-defining, self-exploring, identity-shifting
constitutional citizen of recent Supreme Court decisions of race, gender, and sexuality”).
See, e.g., J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1342–47 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Silberman, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a class representative seeking access to abortion services for juvenile immigrants in government
custody cannot adequately represent the class because it might include juvenile immigrants who
oppose abortion).
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B. An Equality Principle
Many of us who have opposed manifestations of neoliberalism in civil
procedure have couched our resistance in terms better suited to the Federal
Rules System. Whatever their redistributionist effects, Twombly and Iqbal are
flawed, we argue, because they undermine or ignore rulemaker primacy.196
The conservative legal movement’s successes in the courts deserve criticism
more generally for “circumvent[ing]” “the rulemaking process prescribed by
the Rules Enabling Act.”197 Fixes to what ails American civil justice lie with
a better-balanced or less politicized rulemaking process.198 Such arguments
have merit, but they remain committed to principles that have eroded, ones
that do not engage frontally with the principle of neoliberalism.
A fully developed alternative will require a lot of theoretical spadework.199
What follows is a first step, an initial direction that progressive procedural
theorizing might pursue as part of an effort to move beyond neoliberalism in
procedure. In a landmark essay, Jedidiah Britton-Purdy, David Grewal, Amy
Kapcyznski, and K. Sabeel Rahman suggest a response to the forces that
eroded the postwar liberal consensus, especially the exploding inequality that
a neoliberal legal program has helped to drive.200 Because law constitutes
market relations and constrains democratic politics, they explain, deepening
inequality and entrenched subordination are a political choice. They do not
result from neutral market forces or social relations left alone.201 A different
politics counsels for the reconstitution of American law “around an ideal of
equality,” one “animated by a commitment to [democracy] and sensitive to
the importance of social subordination along intersectional lines,”202 and one
committed to redistribution of the sort needed to remove from market
ordering basic issues of need and dignity.203

196

197
198
199
200
201
202
203

See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 821, 850 (2010) (criticizing “adjudication” as “hardly the preferred path to design change”);
Burbank, supra note 10, at 549 (“ General rules made through the Enabling Act Process can only
be changed through that process (or by legislation).”); David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive
Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 972 (criticizing Twombly
and Iqbal on grounds that the Court erred in its interpretation of Rule 8).
Subrin & Main, supra note 14, at 1889.
See infra note 173.
For an important step in this direction, see Norris, supra note 17, at 52–53.
Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 179, at 1786.
Id. at 1819–20.
Id. at 1824.
Id. at 1825.
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A robust version of an equality principle conceived of in these terms
would counsel that procedural change pursue anti-subordination ends,204
reflecting “a broader state obligation to shift affirmatively the subordinate
status of certain groups.”205 An anti-subordination principle merits more
attention and development, but its recommendation here is arguably
premature without a fully-realized account of litigation as an appropriate
institutional setting for its pursuit.206
As a first step, progressives might recommend a non-subordination
principle. At the least, procedural doctrine should disfavor civil litigation’s
use to entrench “the subordinate position” “of a specially disadvantaged
group.”207 This principle does not need a fully-realized account of litigation
and equality. It draws its justification from the simple recognition that a lot
of adjudication presently departs from the meaningfully adversarial process
between parties of roughly equal litigating capacity that the Federal Rules
System idealized, in ways that systemically subordinate particular groups.208
At present, millions of civil cases proceed against litigants, such as
consumer debtors or undocumented immigrants, who cannot defend
themselves meaningfully. From a neoliberal perspective, these situations
result from market failure. Consumer debtors and undocumented
immigrants are priced out of the market for legal representation, at most
warranting a market subsidy (pro bono counsel, for instance) as a response.
A non-subordination perspective understands litigation of this sort as a
constituent part of an industry or government enforcement regime premised,
at least in part, on the maintenance of this inequality.209 A procedural system
committed to a principle of non-subordination would raise barriers to the use
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On anti-subordination and equality, see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9, 9 (2003).
Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 839 (2021).
Cf. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 179, at 1824 (“A call for equality must suggest how that equality
is to be . . . institutionally realized.”). For a rich discussion of civil justice’s functions, including a
possible distributive justice function, see Matthew A. Shapiro, Distributing Civil Justice, 109 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2021) (draft at 52–67).
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 157 (1976).
On the Federal Rules, idealized procedure, and how adjudication actually proceeds, see generally
Spaulding, supra note 124. On asymmetries in who appears in what capacity in civil litigation, and
thus who bears costs and enjoys benefits of particular procedural doctrines, see Resnik, Domain,
supra note 14, at 2225.
For what was surely an unintentionally revealing statement recognizing the important effect of
juvenile immigrants’ lack of representation on the efficiency of immigration enforcement, see
C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2018) (insisting that “[m]andating free courtappointed counsel could further strain an already overextended immigration system” by requiring
government lawyers to “communicat[e] with opposing counsel” and “respon[d] to motions”).
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of civil litigation for these ends, not paper them over with overwhelmed legal
aid lawyers or underpaid court-funded counsel.
Doctrinal changes consistent with a principle of non-subordination would
require the rejection of trans-substantivity. As the signature doctrinal design
feature of the Federal Rules System, trans-substantivity owed its normative
justification to the system’s institutional arrangements.210 A trans-substantive
rule meant that the rulemaking process had honored the principle of substantive
neutrality, which legitimized the process and steered problems of procedural
design to it in the first place. But trans-substantivity lacks a compelling
normative justification now that the domain of substantive neutrality has
shrunken to the point that it can no longer encompass most meaningful
procedural reform. If courts are the only procedural lawmaking institutions left
standing in an age of dissensus, and if procedure is indeed a domain of
substantive contestation, then a demand that court-fashioned procedure be
trans-substantive, on grounds that “[n]either judges nor procedural reformers
have a general charter to reform society,” no longer persuades.211
The problem with trans-substantive procedure is its premise, that all
litigants, whatever their claims or defenses, warrant formally equal
procedural treatment. This conception of equality is indifferent to the reality
of deep, entrenched injustice,212 and thus to the contribution that procedure
can make to these inequalities’ reproduction and entrenchment. Debt
collection plaintiffs routinely file factually barren complaints, with allegations
that often lack basic loan amount and ownership information.213 Sparse
allegations surely reflect dynamics in the debt collection market. Debt sellers
often sell consumer debt without warranting that they actually own the debt,
a fact surely reflected in the price debt buyers are willing to pay.214 These
market practices work, at least in part, because of the modesty of the transsubstantive pleading standard. Because pleading doctrine does not allow the

210

211

212
213
214

For a discussion of trans-substantivity’s justification, see David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the
Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1220–36. For skepticism, see Robert G. Bone,
Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (2006) (claiming that
the “trans-substantive ideal” “does not fit any plausible theory of American civil adjudication”).
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (1987) (reviewing
RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985)).
Cf. Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1229–30 (2002)
(explaining how “deeply entrenched hierarchy” can lurk under a “façade of formal neutrality”).
E.g., NEW YORK APPLESEED, supra note 154, at 20.
Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 43 (2015) (highlighting that
the low price of debt reflects the lack of information provided to the buyer and that the risk that the
“debt will ultimately be uncollectible”).
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classification of litigants based on who they are or the types of claims they
assert, debt collectors do not generally need to allege more specific facts in
their complaints, ones for which they might have to pay a higher price. A
direct line, then, connects the formal neutrality of trans-substantive pleading
standards to debt collection litigation’s entrenchment of inequality.
If conditions of dissensus indeed make courts the primary institutional
settings for procedural change going forward, then a principle of nonsubordination could guide doctrinal elaboration in two ways. First, it could
inform how trial courts administer procedure within the ample grant of
discretion that rule regimes afford. Discovery, for instance, offers plenty of
opportunities for a judge to realize a commitment to non-subordination in
how she regulates the parties’ evidence-gathering.215
Second, the principle could guide doctrinal design itself if dynamics of
acquiescence and delegation continue to enable judges to craft procedure.
Debt buyers often sue without having either the original loan contract or
chain of title information in their possession. Service of process routinely goes
awry. Pro se defendants almost never engage in discovery. Courts thus enter
default judgments against oblivious defendants, and these judgments may
give entities that do not even own the debt the power to execute. A judge
concerned about subordination might require a complaint that alleges
specific facts about debt origins, amount, and ownership; more rigorous
efforts at service of process; and expanded mandatory initial disclosures that
require the plaintiff to produce the sort of loan documents that any
competent defense counsel would request in discovery.216
A departure from the Federal Rules System’s core principles may seem
reckless at a moment when a young, energized group of judges committed to
the principle of neoliberalism populate the federal bench in significant
numbers.217 But progressives should nonetheless pursue the elaboration and
realization of an equality principle, whether committed to non- or antisubordination, for at least three reasons. First, some state judiciaries may be
receptive. Second, complaints that one Supreme Court decision or another
215
216
217

For a discussion of discovery and sensitivity to the sorts of concerns that animate a nonsubordination principle, see Carroll, supra note 193, at 281–88.
NEW YORK APPLESEED, supra note 154, at 4, 12, 26.
Marcus, supra note 37, at 311 (“The adage that the perfect is the enemy of the good may apply here.”).
On the proportion of Trump appointments to the federal bench relative to its overall size, see John
Gramlich, How Trump Compares With Other Recent Presidents in Appointing Federal Judges, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/15/how-trump-compares-withother-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges [https://perma.cc/H8U9-VBAF]. For a measure
of these appointments’ ideology, see JON GREEN, THE IDEOLOGY OF TRUMP’S JUDGES (2019).

2462

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23.6

violates the principle of rulemaker primacy or substantive neutrality yields
the terrain the new procedural system will occupy to the principle of
neoliberalism. Finally, as Professor Burbank’s history of the Enabling Act
conveys, a new procedural system may require a lengthy “antecedent period
of travail” before it rounds into form.218 There is great value in starting the
work now, even if a new procedural system, like the Federal Rules System it
will replace, takes decades to emerge.
CONCLUSION
Professor Burbank surely will disagree with much of what I have argued
here.219 That I have marshaled so much of his work in support of my claims
suggests one of two possibilities. Perhaps I have not read him faithfully. My
hope is that an alternative is true, that I, like so many proceduralists, find
endless, kaleidoscopic lessons in Professor Burbank’s scholarship. I am
grateful for all he has done for me and for the national procedure
community, and I hope that the elaboration and critique of a new procedural
system—if it is indeed in the offing—can meet the impossibly high standard
he has set.
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Burbank, supra note 6, at 1035.
E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the Work
of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 2009 (1997) (“[F]idelity to the rule of law in a democracy
requires that . . . the judiciary abide irrationality and irresponsibility in the political branches . . . .”).

